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CLOUD COVER: PRIVACY PROTECTIONS AND
THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT IN
THE AGE OF CLOUD COMPUTING
Hien Timothy M. Nguyen*
INURODUCTION
Internet technology has completely revolutionized the way peo-
ple interact, how companies transact business, and the type and
amount of information that is available to the public. From its begin-
nings as a forum for users to transmit messages to the emergence of
social networking and media services, each stage of development has
transformed the way we live. Cloud computing has been heralded as
the next stage in this evolution, with the potential to transform how
both individual users and companies use computers and the Internet.
Yet, what is cloud computing and what are the privacy implications for
its users?
Cloud computing concerns "both the applications delivered as
services over the Internet and the hardware and systems software in
the datacenters that provide those services."' The basis of "the cloud
is a collection of [interconnected] computers and servers that are
publicly accessible via the Internet."2 Individual users connect to the
cloud from their own computing devices, over the Internet, and "the
cloud is seen as a single application, device, or document."3 The
hardware in the cloud, which is the collection of computers and serv-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2012; B.A., Political
Science, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2008. Many thanks to Professor
Patricia Bellia, the Notre Dame Law Review, and Wendy Tran for their helpful
comments and careful edits on this Note. I would also like to thank Christine Chiang
for her support and encouragement throughout law school. Finally, I would like to
thank my family, Ruc, Kim, Elizabeth, and Danielle, for their unceasing love and
support.
1 Michael Armbrust et al., Above the Clouds: A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing, UC
BERKELEY RELIABLE ADATrvE DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS LAB., 1 (Feb. 10, 2009),
www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2009/EECS-2009-28.pdf.
2 MICHAEL MILLER, CLOUD COMPUTING 16 (2009).
3 See id.
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ers, is invisible to the end user.4 For example, a cloud service such as
Google Docs allows me to create documents from my home by log-
ging into Google's website. I, or other authorized users, can then edit
that same document while at school, at the airport, or at the library. If
someone steals my laptop or if its hard drive crashes, I will still have a
copy on the cloud service (and perhaps multiple backups of older ver-
sions). Similar services exist for users to purchase computing power 5
or storage space 6 that is accessible on any computer. In the case of
computing power, a user developing an application would save on
physical space, avoid the cost of buying, maintaining, and operating
the servers, and benefit from scalability.
As with most technological advancements, the law is often slow to
catch up. While users might have an expectation that the files or
applications they store on the cloud are private, the reality is that they
may not have as much privacy as they would like to believe. 7 The
architecture of the Internet and the way cloud computing services
operate means that courts are unlikely to apply Fourth Amendment
protections. The current federal statutory framework governing
stored electronic communications, the Stored Communications Act8
(SCA) remains frozen in a 1980s conception of electronic communi-
4 See id.
5 See, e.g., Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2), AMAZON WEB SERVICES,
http://aws.amazon.com/ec2 (last visited Sept. 6, 2011); Google App Engine, GOOGLE,
http://code.google.com/appengine (last visited Sept. 6, 2011); Windows Azure,
MICROSOFr CORP., http://www.microsoft.com/windowsazure (last visited Sept. 6,
2011).
6 See, e.g., DROPBOX, http://www.dropbox.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2011); SUGAR-
SYNC, https://www.sugarsync.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
7 Some notable statements have been made with regards to the lack of privacy
one can expect on the Internet. See, e.g., Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social
Norm, Says Facebook Founder, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www.guardian
.co.uk/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy (reciting Facebook founder Mark
Zuckerberg's comment that privacy is "something that has evolved over time" and that
"[p]eople have really gotten comfortable not only sharing more information and dif-
ferent kinds, but more openly and with more people"); Polly Sprenger, Sun on Pri-
vacy: 'Get Over It,'WIRED NEWS (Jan. 26, 1999), http://www.wired.com/politics/law/
news/1999/01/17538 (reciting the comment of Sun Microsystems's CEO Scott
McNealy that "[y]ou have zero privacy anyway .... Get over it."); see also DANIEL J.
SOLO'V, THE DIGITAL PERSON 1-3 (2004) (discussing "digital dossiers," or collections
of detailed information about individuals based on their online activities). However,
in the case of many cloud computing services, the privacy expectation lies in the con-
tent of the data stored or transmitted through the cloud. This is similar to how one
might retain an expectation of privacy in a rental locker, but not necessarily the record
that one has a locker with a particular service. See infra notes 37, 107-08 and accom-
panying text.
8 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006).
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cations. It is a confusing statute9 that the courts have interpreted in
an inconsistent and unclear manner.'0
This Note argues that the Stored Communications Act and its pri-
vacy protections are inadequate in the modern age of cloud comput-
ing, especially where users of cloud services might naturally have an
expectation of such protection. The Internet has proven itself to be a
driving force for economic and technological growth, and cloud com-
puting promises to be the next step in its evolution. However, one
legal obstacle to the widespread adoption of cloud computing tech-
nologies, especially among corporate users, is that the current legal
framework offers inadequate privacy protections. As a result, I pro-
pose several amendments to the SCA to bring it up to date with mod-
ern technology. In Part I, this Note examines the current state of
legal protections for online privacy. I start with the Fourth Amend-
ment and explain how, as it is currently interpreted, Fourth Amend-
ment protections are unlikely to apply to Internet communications
because of the third-party doctrine, which holds that users do not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy for information disclosed to
third parties. Then, I consider the Stored Communications Act,
which was Congress's attempt to fill the void of privacy protections for
stored electronic communications. In Part II, I discuss the advance-
ments in technology since the SCA, especially the trend towards
increased use of cloud computing services. In Part III, I address why
the SCA may not be applicable to many of these cloud services.
Finally, in Part IV, I discuss expectations of privacy in the cloud and
why Congress ought to enhance the SCA's privacy protections. I also
propose three modifications to the SCA to achieve this aim of greater
privacy protections in the cloud computing age. I will argue that Con-
gress should eliminate the distinction between electronic communica-
tions services and remote computing services, that the statute should
include a suppression remedy, and that Congress should clarify the
9 See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002)
("We observe that until Congress brings the laws in line with modern technology,
protection of the Internet and websites such as Konop's will remain a confusing and
uncertain area of the law.").
10 Compare Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding
that an e-mail acquired from post-transmission storage was in "electronic storage,"
because the ISP saved it for purposes of "backup protection"), with In re DoubleClick,
Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that an e-mail is
only in electronic storage "incident to [its] transmission" and only until downloaded),
and Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 633-34, 636 (E.D. Pa.
2001) (finding that "backup protection" includes only temporary backup storage
pending delivery and thus an e-mail acquired from post-transmission storage was not
in electronic storage).
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limits of voluntary disclosures. I justify these changes based on the
privacy interest that users retain in their use of cloud services.
I. LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR ONLINE PRIVACY
The right to privacy has been described as "the most comprehen-
sive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."" However,
conceptualizing this right has been a "contested endeavor."' 12 Some
scholars contend that protection of privacy promotes individual
autonomy and is essential to deliberative democracy, 13 while others
argue for privacy based on economic efficiency. 14 One scholar, Ken
Gormley, identified four major approaches to privacy: (1) Roscoe
Pound and Paul Freund's view that privacy was "an expression of one's
personality or personhood, focusing upon the right of the individual to
define his or her essence as a human being";15 (2) scholarship like
Louis Henkin's marking of privacy "within the boundaries of auton-
omy--the moral freedom of the individual to engage in his or her own
thoughts, actions and decisions";1 6 (3) scholarship such as Alan Wes-
tin and Charles Fried's understanding of privacy "in terms of citizens'
ability to regulate information about themselves, and thus control their
relationships with other human beings, such that individuals have the
right to decide 'when, how, and to what extent information about
them is communicated to others' ";17 and (4) the view of scholars like
Ruth Gavison who have "taken a more noncommittal, mix-and-match
approach, breaking down privacy into two or three essential compo-
11 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
12 Danielle Keats Citron & Leslie Meltzer Henry, Visionay Pragmatism and the
Value of Privacy in the Twenty-First Century, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1107 (2010); see also
Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 393 (1978) ("The concept
of 'privacy' is elusive and ill defined.").
13 SeeJulie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object,
52 STAN. L. REv. 1373, 1423-28 (2000) (contending that informational privacy pro-
motes individual autonomy, which comports with values of individual dignity and
equality, promotes diversity of speech and behavior, and is essential to participation
in a democratic society); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52
VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1651-53 (1999) (arguing that strong information privacy rules
are necessary for deliberative democracy and individual self-determination, which
would be limited if widespread and secret surveillance were the norm); see also Neil M.
Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 388-91 (2008) (arguing that intel-
lectual privacy, or the protection of records of our intellectual activities, is essential to
First Amendment free thought and expression).
14 See Posner, supra note 12, at 404.
15 Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REV. 1335, 1337.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 1337-38 (quoting ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACV AND FREEDOM 7 (1967)).
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nents," such as "secrecy, anonymity and solitude"18 or "repose, sanctu-
ary and intimate decision."19
With these often intertwined understandings20 in mind, the rapid
development of new technologies-particularly in the area of the
Internet-has presented many new and unforeseen challenges for the
protection of privacy, 21 especially since there is a tension in informa-
tion privacy law between privacy and security. 22 The proliferation of
new technologies also brings with it more elaborate record-keeping
systems that can reveal the most intimate details of a person's life.
23
Yet, new ways of conducting business and social interactions on the
Internet also allow for additional threats to citizens and the State.
Security involves society's interest in protecting against these threats,
which often includes monitoring and information-gathering activi-
ties.24 These activities also often pose a serious threat to citizens' pri-
vacy, because of the vast amount of information that they can reveal.
25
Much of privacy law seeks to provide some sort of balance between
these competing interests. This Part examines the primary constitu-
tional mechanism for protecting privacy, the Fourth Amendment, as
well as the relevant statute for protecting one's privacy in stored elec-
tronic communications-the Stored Communications Act.
A. The Fourth Amendment and Its Limits
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t] he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
18 Id. at 1338 (quoting Ruth Gavison, Privacy, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 433 (1980)).
19 Id. (quoting Gary L. Bostwick, Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctu-
ary, and Intimate Decision, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1447, 1447 (1976)).
20 See FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 19 (1997).
21 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHwARTz, PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND TECH-
NOLOGY 1 (2d ed. 2009).
22 See id. at 77.
23 The extensive records of an individual, which Daniel Solove termed "digital
dossiers," and the "horde of aggregated bits of information [can be] combined to
reveal a portrait of who we are based upon what we buy, the organizations we belong
to, how we navigate the Internet, and which shows and videos we watch." Daniel J.
Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
1083, 1095 (2002).
24 See SOLOVE & SCHWART, supra note 21, at 77.
25 Cf id. ("Throughout the twentieth century, technology provided the govern-
ment significantly greater ability to probe into the private lives of individuals."). As
the Sixth Circuit noted, "[b]y obtaining access to someone's email, government
agents gain the ability to peer deeply into his activities" because everything from lov-
ers' exchanges to business plans are exchanged over e-mail, providing for "an account
of its owner's life." United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010).
2o011] 2193
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unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. '26 The
Supreme Court has recognized that "[t] he overriding function of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against
unwarranted intrusion by the State." 27 Although this has been inter-
preted to allow for strong protections for a person in his or her physi-
cal home,28 the architecture of the Internet and the way users create,
store, and access information on their computers means that Fourth
Amendment protections for Internet communications are either
unclear or may not exist at all. 29 A typical Internet user does not have
a physical "home" or any truly private space on the Internet, but
rather different types of accounts with different service providers that
are used to store information. 30 These accounts consist of data that is
stored on remote servers and the user's private information is sent to
private third parties through their remote computers. 3 1
With this in mind, the biggest difficulty in applying current
Fourth Amendment doctrine to Internet communications is the
courts' narrow interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's reasonable
expectation of privacy test in communication networks. 32 Because an
individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in infor-
mation revealed to third parties,33 and since the architecture of the
Internet necessitates data transfers to third-party servers, courts have
traditionally been reluctant to find that Internet users retain a reason-
able expectation of privacy in information they send over the
26 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
27 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
28 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) ("'At the very core' of the
Fourth Amendment 'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home* and there
be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."' (quoting Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))).
29 See In re United States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1213 (D. Or. 2009) ("This feature
of the Internet has profound implications for how the Fourth Amendment protects
Internet communications-if it protects them at all. The law here remains unclear
and commentators have noted that there are several reasons that the Fourth Amend-
ment's privacy protections for the home may not apply to our 'virtual homes'
online."); Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1208, 1209-10 (2004).
30 See Kerr, supra note 29, at 1209-10.
31 See id.
32 See Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother
That Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 607, 627 (2003).
33 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) ("[T]he Fourth Amend-
ment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and
conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on
the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence
placed in the third party will not be betrayed.").
[VOL. 86:52194
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Internet.34 Furthermore, "the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a
search or seizure . . . effected by a private party on his own initiative
... [unless] the private party acted as an instrument or agent of the
Government."3 5 As most Internet communications services are private
actors, there would be no Fourth Amendment protection when a pro-
vider searches its own servers for a user's data and discloses it to the
government or a third party.36 Thus, although the Fourth Amend-
ment provides citizens with strong protections from government
intrusion into physical spaces, its protections are much more limited
in the context of cyber spaces on the Internet. 37
34 See, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333-36 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding that there
was no expectation of privacy in materials intended for publication or public posting,
in e-mail that had already reached its recipient, and in non-content subscriber infor-
mation disclosed to a user's Internet service provider); In re United States, 665 F. Supp.
2d at 1224 (using the third-party doctrine to find that since the defendants volunta-
rily, by their acquiescence to the ISP's privacy policy, conveyed to the ISPs and
exposed to the ISP's employees the contents of their e-mails, there was no Fourth
Amendment violation). But see United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir.
2010) (finding that Fourth Amendment protection applied to contents of e-mail com-
munications, because individuals maintain reasonable expectations of privacy in e-
mails). The recent Warshak decision highlights the changes in our understanding of
technology, its role in our lives, and how the SCA protects privacy. The court analo-
gized an e-mail to a letter or phone call, and the commercial ISP as "the functional
equivalent of a post office or a telephone company." Id. at 286. Since Fourth Amend-
ment protections apply to letters passing through the post office or telephone calls,
the court concluded that the police could not seize the contents of Warshak's e-mail
with merely a subpoena. Id. at 288.
35 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989) (citing United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 487 (1971)).
36 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding that
the defendant was not entitled to Fourth Amendment protections when AOL, an
Internet service provider with whom the defendant had an e-mail account, reported
the defendant's use of its e-mail services to transmit child pornography); United
States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that an anonymous
hacker who performed a search on the defendant's computer was a private actor and
not acting as a government agent, and thus there was no Fourth Amendment
violation).
37 This is not without controversy, as noted above at note 29, because some courts
have suggested that users do retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in their e-mail.
See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008) ("E-mail, like
physical mail, has an outside address 'visible' to the third-party carriers that transmit it
to its intended location, and also a package of content that the sender presumes will
be read only by the intended recipient. The privacy interests in these two forms of
communication are identical. The contents may deserve Fourth Amendment protec-
tion, but the address and size of the package do not."); United States v. Cioffi, 668 F.
Supp. 2d 385, 390 n.7 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) ("One preliminary matter is not in question:
The government does not dispute that [the defendant] had a reasonable expectation
2011] 2195
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B. The Stored Communications Act
To address the uncertainty in the area of the Internet and elec-
tronic communications, Congress passed the Stored Communications
Act in 1986 as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.3 8
By passing the SCA, Congress hoped to encourage the development
and use of new and emerging methods of communication through
protecting citizens' privacy expectations. 39 The SCA (1) limits the
government's ability to compel providers to disclose information that
they are storing and (2) limits the provider's ability to disclose infor-
mation to both governmental and non-governmental entities volunta-
rily.40 It does this by differentiating between two broad categories of
providers: (1) electronic communications services (ECS) and (2)
remote computing services (RCS). The level of privacy protection
afforded to a stored communication differs based on which category
the communication provider falls in (for that communication), and in
some instances, how long the communication has been stored.
of privacy in the contents of his personal email account."). Some scholars also advo-
cate application of the Fourth Amendment to the Internet. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia
& Susan Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored E-mai4 2008 U. CI. LEGAL F.
121, 125 (contending that e-mail users generally retain a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the e-mails stored on their ISPs' computers). Professor Patricia Bellia
points out that the situation of an electronic communications service provider is more
similar to the telephone company in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), where
there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in using a phone booth, than United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), where
one lacks an expectation of privacy in one's bank records or the telephone number
one dials. See Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1375, 1403-06 (2004). In Miller and Smith, the information was con-
veyed so that the third party could do something with that information, such as pro-
vide banking services or put through a telephone call. See id. at 1403. In the case of
an electronic communications service provider, the contents of the communications
are not necessary or relevant for the service provider to transmit the communication.
See id. Furthermore, as in Katz, even though the provider might have the technical
ability to "listen" in to the contents, the user still expects the communications to be
private. See id. at 1405.
38 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); S. REP. No.
99-541, at 1-3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555-57.
39 See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3559.
40 See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006) (stating the statute's provisions for a provider's
voluntary disclosures); id. § 2703 (stating the statute's provisions for the government's
ability to compel a provider's disclosure).
2196 [VOL. 86:5
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1. Electronic Communications Services
In the technology world of 1986, electronic communications ser-
vices mainly dealt with data transmissions and electronic mail.4 1 The
SCA defines an "electronic communication service" as "any service
which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or
electronic communications. '42 The statute also distinguishes between
those communications that are in "electronic storage" and those that
are not. Electronic storage is "any temporary, intermediate storage of
a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic trans-
mission... [and] any storage of such communication by an electronic
communication service for purposes of backup protection of such
communication." 43
As for what is required of the government to compel disclosure,
§ 2703(a) requires presenting a search warrant if the provider has
held the communication in "electronic storage" for 180 days or less.4 4
If the communication has been held for more than 180 days (or is
held by an RCS), then § 2703(b) allows for the government to compel
disclosure with less than notice to the subscriber and a search war-
rant.45 The government can use a search warrant without notice to
the subscriber, or can present the provider with an administrative or
grand jury subpoena and provide notice to the subscriber, or can
secure a court order under § 2703(d) of the statute.4 6 A "2703(d)
order is not equivalent to a search warrant"47 and may be issued if the
government can demonstrate "specific and articulable facts showing
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents of a
wire or electronic communication ... are relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation." 48 If the information sought is the
subscriber's identifying information, such as his or her name,
addresses (physical, e-mail, or IP), or phone number, then only a sub-
poena is required. 49 Alternatively, a service provider can voluntarily
41 See H.R. REP. No. 99-647, at 21-23 (1986).
42 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15). An "electronic communication" is "any transfer of
signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted
in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical
system that affects interstate or foreign commerce." Id. § 2510(12).
43 Id. § 2510(17).
44 Id. § 2703(a).
45 Id. § 2703(b).
46 Id.
47 Bellia, supra note 37, at 1417.
48 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
49 Id. § 2703(c)(2). An Internet Protocol (IP) address is the "numerical address
by which a location in the Internet is identified." Glossary, INTERNET CORP. FOR
20111 2197
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disclose the subscriber's identifying information to any non-govern-
mental entity.50 When it comes to voluntary disclosures of data, the
SCA only allows a public service provider (one that offers its services
to the public) to disclose the data if it meets one of the exceptions in
§ 2702(b). 51 However, if the service provider is private (one that does
not provide services to the general public), then it is not bound by the
disclosure limitations of the SCA.52
For purposes of ECS classification, electronic storage covers (1)
temporary and intermediate storage of a communication incidental to
the transmission and (2) storage for backup protection of the commu-
nication. If a user has not retrieved a communication, then it is in
electronic storage, because "its storage by the service provider is 'tem-
porary,' 'intermediate,' and 'incidental' to its transmission."5 3 If the
service provider retains copies of the unopened communication in
the event of a service disruption, that would also qualify as being in
electronic storage.54 The cases become more problematic where the
communication has been opened, but retained by the service provider
on the user's behalf.55
Courts have differed in their interpretation of what "electronic
storage" includes. 56 The Ninth Circuit's approach in Theofel v. Farey-
Jones57 claims that an Internet service provider's copy of the message
functions as a "backup" for the user (as opposed to "backup" only
including temporary backup storage pending delivery). 58 However,
some scholars have claimed that the Ninth Circuit's reasoning is
"strained"59 and "relies on the assumption that users download emails
from an ISP's server to their own computers. '60 Although that is how
many e-mail systems work (such as in a work or university environ-
ment), many other e-mail systems are "web-based" and "remote."61
These e-mail systems function similarly to many cloud computing ser-
ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS (Aug. 13, 2010), http://www.icann.org/en/general/
glossary.htm.
50 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6).
51 Id. § 2702(a).
52 Id.
53 Bellia, supra note 37, at 1417.
54 See id.
55 See id.
56 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
57 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).
58 Id. at 1075.
59 See Bellia, supra note 37, at 1419; Kerr, supra note 29, at 1217-18.
60 See United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772 (C.D. Ill. 2009).
61 Id. (citing Fischer v. Mt. Olive Lutheran Church, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 914, 917
(W.D. Wis. 2002)). Web-based e-mail, where the e-mails are stored on the cloud, can
2198 [VOL. 86:5
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vices, in that they are accessible over the web from any computer and
do not automatically download the messages or data to the user's own
computer.62 A user may view the message on the website, save it on
the remote server, and re-access it later on the remote server.63 As
Theofel notes, "[a] remote computing service might be the only place a
user stores his messages; in that case, the messages are not stored for
backup purposes. ' 64 Thus, even under the Ninth Circuit approach, it
is very unlikely that data stored on cloud computing services will have
the benefit of warrant protection.
2. Remote Computing Services
Congress intended the SCA's category of remote computing ser-
vices to cover outsourced computer processing and data storage. 65 In
the era in which Congress enacted the SCA, users would outsource
data storage and large amounts of computer processing to remote
servers.66 As these remote computing services were third-party ser-
vices that would need a copy of the user's data, they raised privacy
concerns over the handling of such data.67 In addition to meeting the
definition that a provider offers to the public "computer storage or
processing services by means of an electronic communications sys-
tem,"68 a provider must also satisfy some other requirements. The
include some more popular types of e-mail services, such as Gmail, Hotmail, or
Yahoo! Mail.
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004).
65 The Senate Report on the SCA noted that:
In the age of rapid computerization, a basic choice has faced the users of
computer technology. That is, whether to process data inhouse on the
user's own computer or on someone else's equipment. Over the years,
remote computer service companies have developed to provide sophisti-
cated and convenient computing services to subscribers and customers from
remote facilities. Today businesses of all sizes-hospitals, banks and many
others-use remote computing services for computer processing. This
processing can be done with the customer or subscriber using the facilities
of the remote computing service in essentially a time-sharing arrangement,
or it can be accomplished by the service provider on the basis of information
supplied by the subscriber or customer. Data is most often transmitted
between these services and their customers by means of electronic
communications.
S. REP. No. 99-541, at 10-11 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3564-65.
66 See id. at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557.
67 See id.
68 18 U.S.C. § 2711(2) (2006).
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data must be received electronically from the customer 69 and the con-
tent must be "carried or maintained" by the service provider "solely
for the purpose of providing storage or computer processing services"
to the customer.70 Furthermore, the provider cannot be authorized
to "access the [customer's] content[ ] . .. for purposes of providing
any services other than storage or computer processing."' 7' Communi-
cations stored under the remote computing services category receive
less protection than those that qualify as held under electronic com-
munications services. Communications can be compelled by a sub-
poena with notice, a § 2703(d) order with notice, or a search
warrant. 72
II. THE CLOUD COMPUTING CONTEXT
The concept of outsourcing computing processes and storing
data on remote servers is not new, but advancements in technology
have made it a more viable option for users.73 The emergence of per-
sonal computing in the 1980s meant that there was a focus on the
individual computer. Thus, software programs ran individually on
each computer and documents were stored on the computer on
which they were created.74 Networking quickly developed as a way for
corporate users to share files, exchange messages, and backup valua-
ble data.75 By the early 1990s, the Internet emerged 76 and since then
has grown exponentially into a global platform that facilitates much of
the world's social, economic, and political activity. With more people
than ever connected to the Internet, its technologies play a vital role
in the day-to-day lives of many people.
In recent years, the proliferation of broadband Internet connec-
tions has enabled the development of new technologies that take
advantage of such connections, such as cloud computing. The
National Institute of Standards and Technology defines three basic
types of cloud computing services: (1) Cloud Software as a Service
69 See id. §§ 2702(a)(2)(A), 2703(b)(2)(A).
70 See id. §§ 2702(a) (2) (B), 2703(b) (2) (B).
71 Id. § 2702(a)(2) (B).
72 Id. § 2703.
73 See Armbrust, supra note 1, at 2 ("Cloud Computing is a new term for a long-held
dream of computing as a utility, which has recently emerged as a commercial reality."
(footnote omitted)).
74 Cf MILLER, supra note 2, at 18 (touting the benefit of cloud computing arising
from its holding multiple copies of documents, rather than simple storage on the
creator's hard drive).
75 See PAUL E. CERUZZI, A HISTORY OF MODERN COMPUTING, 292-95 (2d ed. 2003).
76 See id. at 295-96.
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(SaaS), (2) Cloud Platform as a Service (PaaS), and (3) Cloud Infra-
structure as a Service (IaaS) .77 SaaS involves the "capability provided
to the consumer.., to use the provider's applications running on a
cloud infrastructure. '78 This can range from productivity applications
such as word processing, spreadsheet, and presentation programs79 to
entertainment hubs (video and music)80 and video conferencing sys-
tems.8' PaaS involves the "capability provided to the consumer ... to
deploy onto the cloud infrastructure consumer-created or acquired
applications created using programming languages and tools sup-
ported by the provider."8 2 PaaS providers furnish "the entire applica-
tion environment including hardware, operating system, and
application platform,"8 3 so that IT organizations or aspiring develop-
ers can quickly create and manage applications. An example of this is
Microsoft's Windows Azure, which "provide[s] the functionality to
build applications that span from consumer Web to enterprise scena-
rios."84 Finally, laaS involves the "capability provided to the consumer
... to provision processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental
computing resources."8 5 Instead of a complete platform, IaaS provid-
ers supply only the necessary resources that organizations require. An
example might be Netflix, an established online video rental service,
moving its existing Internet technology to the cloud via Amazon Web
Services. 86
77 See Peter Mell & Tim Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, NAT'L
INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH (Oct. 7, 2009), http://csrc.nist.gov/itl/cloud/upload/
cloud-def-vi5.pdf.
78 Id.
79 See, e.g., Microsoft Office Web Apps, MICRosOr CORP., http://office.microsoft
.com/en-us/web-apps (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
80 See, e.g., Qriocity, SONY NETWORK ENT. INT'L, http://www.qriocity.com/us/en
(last visited Sept. 6, 2011); Watch Instantly, NETFLIX, https://www.netflix.com/Browse
Genres/WatchInstantly/gev (last visited Sept. 6, 2011). These services often adver-
tise their ability to let users select from a large library of music or videos at any given
time, from anywhere the user may be.
81 See, e.g., Cisco Collaboration Cloud, Cisco, http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/
ps10352/collaboration-cloud.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2011) (advertising its "Consis-
tent Availability," "Scalable Architecture," and "Built-In Outage Protection").
82 Mell & Grance, supra note 77.
83 Drue Reeves, Microsoft Windows Azure, Demystified, CIO (Dec. 4, 2008), http://
www.cio.com/article/468413/MicrosoftWindowsAzureDemystified.
84 Microsoft Windows Azure, MICROSOVr CORP., http://www.microsoft.com/
windowsazure/faq (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
85 Mell & Grance, supra note 77.
86 Brad Stone & Ashlee Vance, 'Cloud' Computing Casts a Spell, N.Y. TIMES, April
19, 2010, at BI.
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Cloud computing has been heralded as being potentially trans-
formative for the way individuals use and interact over the Internet.
Cloud computing allows a user to access his or her data from any com-
puter and facilitates collaboration among multiple users.8 7 Unlike
traditional networking, where a user could only access data if he or
she was logged on to the particular network, cloud computing allows
access from anywhere over an Internet connection.88 Furthermore,
users can benefit from not having to install additional resource inten-
sive applications on their computers (aside from a web browser) in
order to access cloud services.8 9 For example, a person who needs to
create a document might choose to do so on Google Docs or
Microsoft Office Web instead of installing word processing software
on the computer.
In the corporate environment, cloud computing also provides
many benefits. Cloud computing provides scalability, which can be
especially beneficial to emerging companies. Rather than being
forced to invest in equipment,90 software, and personnel to maintain
the systems, companies can purchase computing power and storage
space from a cloud provider.91 Cloud computing provides for flexible
"usage-based pricing,"9 2 because the "hours" purchased through cloud
computing "can be distributed non-uniformly in time (e.g., use 100
server-hours today and no server-hours tomorrow"93 and the company
will only have to pay for the hours it uses.94 In the event of a business
slowdown, where a company needs to scale down its resource usage,
cloud computing might reduce or even eliminate the financial loss of
having under-utilized equipment.95 If a business needs to scale up its
resource usage, cloud computing allows it to add resources quickly,
with very short lead-time of minutes or hours (instead of days or weeks
to procure the physical equipment), which allows the matching of
87 See MILLER, supra note 2, at 12.
88 See id. at 8-9.
89 See David S. Barnhill, Note, Cloud Computing and Stored Communications: Another
Look at Quon v. Arch Wireless, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 621, 640-41 (2010).
90 Armbrust et al., supra note 1, at 10 (" [T]he absence of up-front capital expense
allows capital to be redirected to core business investment.").
91 See Bruce Gain, Cloud Computing of the Future, 32 PROCESSOR, Feb. 26, 2010, at
14, available at http://www.processor.com/editorial/article.asp?article=articles/P
3205/23p05/23p05/23p05.asp; Eric Knorr & Galen Gruman, What Cloud Computing
Really Means, INFOWORLD (April 7, 2008), http://www.infoworld.com/d/cloud-
computing/what-cloud-computing-really-means-031.
92 Armbrust et al., supra note 1, at 10.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 See id. at 12.
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resources to workload much more closely.9 6 For example, an Internet
retailer might be extremely busy during the holidays, but far less busy
during the rest of the year. Cloud computing allows for the retailer to
purchase additional resources during the holiday season to accommo-
date the rush of traffic, without having to purchase and maintain
underutilized systems during the rest of the year.97 This prevents
wasted resources during the rest of the year, and reduces the risk of
accidentally turning away customers during a spike in sales.9 8 Finally,
businesses might save because the cloud provider can pass on some of
the savings they get from their economy-of-scale buying power for
computing hardware and software. 9 9
Yet, there are many privacy implications that come along with the
vast benefits of cloud computing. Having data on the servers of a
cloud service provider instead of your own means that if the provider's
servers are compromised, then your data could potentially also be
compromised. 100 A cloud service provider might retain the right to
disclose information to another party. 10 1 The "terms of service" of
cloud providers might also vary from provider to provider, leading
users to potentially rely on privacy protections that may exist with one
provider, but not another. The growing trend towards cloud comput-
ing usage means that more and more people will be storing their data
on remote servers (which will likely be outside Fourth Amendment
protections, as currently understood).
96 Id.
97 See id. at 10-11.
98 See id.
99 See id. at 12.
100 This issue has been termed "reputation fate-sharing," where although cloud
users might "benefit from a concentration of security expertise at major cloud provid-
ers ... a single subverter can disrupt many users." YANPEI CHEN ET AL., UNIV. CAL.
BERKELEY, WHAT's NEW ABOUT CLOUD COMPUTING SECURITY? 4 (2010), available at
http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/TechRpts/2010/EECS-2010-5.pdf. As an exam-
ple, Chen, et al., notes an April 2009 FBI raid on two Texas data centers that
belonged to Core IP Networks, as part of a general criminal investigation into a com-
pany that previously purchased Core IP services. Id. at 5; see also Robert McMillan,
FBI Raids Dallas Internet Service Provider Core IP, PC WORLD, (April 3, 2009), http://
www.pcworld.com/article/1 62584/fbi raidsdallas_
internetservice-provider coreip.html (reporting on the event). There, FBI agents
seized shared equipment, which caused non-related businesses using the same
datacenters disruptions or even complete closure. CHEN ET AL., supra at 5. An
affected customer that was not the subject of the FBI investigation, but whose equip-
ment was affected, applied for a temporary restraining order, which was denied. Id.
101 See, e.g., Terms of Use, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, http://aws.amazon.com/terms
("AWS reserves the right to refuse service, terminate accounts, remove or edit content
in its sole discretion.") (last updated Feb. 8, 2011).
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Furthermore, it is unlikely that cloud computing services will
have the benefits of the additional protections that come with being
an electronic communications service. Cloud computing services do
not provide the ability to access the Internet, but they provide services
that utilize the Internet. Courts have found that in the case of the
Internet, it is the ISP and the telecommunications companies that fall
into the category of electronic communications service providers,
because they provide the ability to send or receive electronic commu-
nications. 102 As cloud computing users cannot use cloud services
without an existing Internet connection, this suggests that at least
SaaS and PaaS providers are unlikely to be classified as ECS providers.
IaaS providers might be more arguably classified as ECS providers,
depending on their function.
Cloud computing promises to be the future of Internet technol-
ogy, with increasing numbers of people and businesses using cloud
services to store and process data every day. How much the law pro-
tects privacy is a key concern for most of these users. Yet, the limita-
tions of the SCA, a statute that was written nearly twenty-five years ago
and is used to address technologies that were not even imagined at
the time, mean that as cloud computing services become more and
more ubiquitous, peoples' privacy expectations may not line up with
the law's protections.
III. LIMITATIONS OF THE SCA IN THE CLOUD COMPUTING CONTEXT
As forward-thinking as the SCA was for its time, it is not currently
without short-comings. First, the SCA's ECS/RCS distinction seems
particularly anachronistic in the age of cloud computing. The num-
ber of people who use the Internet has increased exponentially10 3 and
102 See Dyer v. Northwest Airlines Corp., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199 (D.N.D. 2004)
("The ECPA definition of 'electronic communications service' clearly includes
internet service providers such as America Online, as well as telecommunications
companies whose cables and phone lines carry internet traffic."); In re DoubleClick,
Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 508, 511 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). DoubleClick
involved a website, which the court noted were the "users" of the "electronic commu-
nication service" of Internet access. Id. at 508-09.
103 In 1986, when Congress passed the statute, the primary users of e-mail and the
Internet were businesses, with very few individuals having Internet access at home. See
Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Per-
spective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1560
(2004); see also Div. OF Sci. RES. STUDIES, NAT'L Sci. FOUND., THE APPLICATION AND
IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES IN THE HOME (2010), available at http:/
/www.nsf.gov/statistics/nsf01313/pdf/socio.pdf (noting that in 1994, the earliest year
for which data were available, only two percent of households had Internet access).
In 2009, seventy-five million households, or 63.5% of Americans, had broadband
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new types of technologies have emerged that fundamentally change
the way people use the Internet. The justification often given for Con-
gress creating a distinction between ECS and RCS is that "by 'renting'
computer storage space with a remote computing service, a customer
places himself in the same situation as one who gives business records
to an accountant or attorney. 10 4
Yet, this analogy is erroneous given the way Internet communica-
tions systems work.105 Although a third party holds the content of the
communications, the user still retains an expectation of privacy. The
user does not expect the third party to use the content to facilitate any
intended transaction, unlike a person handing over financial state-
ments to an accountant. In the case of most cloud computing ser-
vices, the third party is acting merely as a "rental locker" where the
user can store his or her data in a private and secure location on the
Internet or a "package carrier" for the user's data. Conversely, at issue
in United States v. Miller 06 were records, not the contents of private com-
munications. Professor Patricia Bellia notes that "nothing in Miller
suggests that the category [of business records] is all-encompassing-
that one lacks an expectation of privacy in anything in the hands of a
third party,"107 which was also the position adopted by the Sixth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Warshak.108 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
recognized that letters and sealed packages are "as fully guarded from
examination .. .as if they were retained by the parties forwarding
them in their own domiciles."' 0 9 It has also recognized that when
someone maintains personal property on a third party's premises, he
or she retains a reasonable expectation of privacy, even if that third
party has the right to access the property for some purposes. 110 Since
Internet at home. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, (2009),
available at http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/computer/2009/tabO I.xls.
104 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. McKENNA, WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING
§ 7:48 (3d ed. 2007).
105 See supra notes 34 and 37.
106 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
107 Bellia & Freiwald, supra note 37, at 148.
108 631 F.3d 266, 287 (6th Cir. 2010).
109 ExparteJackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877); see also United States v. Thomas, No.
88-6341, 1989 WL 72926, at *2 (6th Cir. July 5, 1989) (per curiam) (finding that bank
customers have an expectation of privacy in the contents of their safe deposit boxes,
such that a warrant is required for the government to access the contents).
110 See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (holding that searching
a hotel room without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment, even though hotel
personnel might enter the room to perform their duties); Chapman v. United States,
365 U.S. 610, 616-18 (1961) (holding that searching a house of a tenant, without a
warrant, in absence of the tenant but with the consent of the landlord, violated the
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most cloud computing providers provide services that are more simi-
lar to these last two functions than that of an accountant receiving
financial statements, the SCA's privacy protections are inadequate
given the user's privacy interest.
Another major limitation in the SCA is that it does not provide
for a suppression remedy.111 This is problematic for several reasons.
First, this means that the government's failure to comply with the SCA
does not avail the defendant of any substantive remedy (unless a court
concludes that the violation rises to the level of a Fourth Amendment
violation). 11 2 Without a proper remedy, the government can get away
with less than adequate procedure.11 3 Additionally, the defendant
would not have a remedy against a service provider, because the ser-
vice provider would simply be complying with a court order, the valid-
ity of which it would have no reason to question, 114 and would be
protected under § 2707(e)'s good faith exception.' 15 Second, the
lack of a suppression remedy means that few defendants have any
incentive to challenge the government's surveillance practices. 116
Without an incentive to challenge the government's practices under
Fourth Amendment, even though the landlord had the authority to enter the prem-
ises); Garcia v. Dykstra, 260 F. App'x 887, 893 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a leased storage unit).
111 See, e.g., United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000)
(finding that the SCA specifically allows for only civil damages and criminal punish-
ment for violations, and that Congress did not intend for suppression to be an option
for a defendant), affd 106 F. App'x 688 (10th Cir. 2004); see also SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ,
supra note 21, at 145 ("The SCA does not provide for an exclusionary rule."). But see
McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215, 220 (D.D.C. 1998) ("While the government
makes much of the fact that § 2703(c) (1) (B) does not provide a cause of action
against the government, it is elementary that information obtained improperly can be
suppressed where an individual's rights have been violated.").
112 See FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 104, § 7:51.
113 See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1264, 1285 (2004) ("Even if the police violate the Act blatantly, they can still use
surveillance evidence obtained from such misconduct against a defendant in a crimi-
nal trial."); see also United States v. Hambrick, 55 F. Supp. 2d 504, 507 (W.D. Va. 1999)
(holding that since "Congress did not provide for suppression where a party obtains
stored data or transactional records in violation of the Act," a defendant's motion to
suppression information was denied, even though the government conceded the inva-
lidity of the subpoena used to obtain the information), affd 225 F.3d 656 (4th Cir.
2000).
114 See FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 104, at § 7:51 (citing United States v. Ken-
nedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1109-10 (D. Kan. 2000)).
115 18 U.S.C. § 2707(e) (2006).
116 See Orin S. Kerr, Lifting the "Fog" of Internet Surveillance: How a Suppression Remedy
Would Change Computer Crime Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 824 (2003).
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the SCA, relatively few cases apply this particular statute. 117 This
results in a statute with a reputation for being poorly understood,
because there are fewer judicial opinions that fully analyze the con-
tours of the statute.
Finally, the SCA's privacy protections are limited because of the
way the statute deals with voluntary disclosures under § 2702 as
opposed to compelled disclosure under § 2703. Voluntary disclosures
are particularly important in the context of the Internet and law
enforcement, because the majority of the action takes place between
law enforcement and the Internet service providers. In many situa-
tions, however, there is a "gray zone" where potential liability for ser-
vice providers disclosing information to the government might be
unclear. 118 Orin Kerr gives two examples of how this might occur:
A police officer contacts an ISP system administrator and explains
that he is investigating a child molestation case. The officer asks the
system administrator if he is interested in helping out the police by
voluntarily disclosing certain files. Wishing to be a good citizen, the
system administrator agrees and turns over files to the agent. Is this
a case of "compelled" disclosure or "voluntary" disclosure? Alterna-
tively, imagine that a system administrator contacts the FBI and
wants to disclose files but then asks for a subpoena just to make sure
there was some sort of documentation of the disclosure. The FBI
agent agrees, forwards a subpoena to the system administrator, and
then accepts the files. Does the presence of the subpoena turn what
was a voluntarily disclosure into a compelled disclosure?1 19
In the first instance, the government solicited a disclosure, yet it
is unclear whether the ISP's compliance was voluntary or if the system
administrator was compelled by believing that the disclosure was
essential. In the second instance, it is unclear whether the system
administrator was actually "compelled" to disclose the information,
because he or she came to the government official intending to dis-
close, notwithstanding the formality of the subpoena. Kerr suggests
that the answers to these questions "depend on what standard courts
eventually adopt to distinguish between compelled and voluntary dis-
closure." 120 A narrow definition of "compelled" disclosure would
mean that the ISP's disclosure was not required, because it could have
refused the police request. This would undermine the SCA's privacy
protections and create the potential for government abuse, because
"[i] f a provider is unaware that it has the obligation to require legal
117 Id. at 823-24.
118 See Kerr, supra note 29, at 1224.
119 See id. at 1224-25.
120 Id. at 1225.
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process 'officials could request records in the hopes that the ISP sim-
ply will comply."' 121 The absence of a suppression remedy means that
"'there is no incentive for the government not to try this method,'
particularly in situations where officers 'suspect that a warrant or sub-
poena will not be granted.' "122
Given that twenty-five years have passed since Congress first
enacted the SCA, not all of its provisions have held up well over time.
The development of technology and our understanding of the legal
implications of new technologies have changed as such technology
use becomes more widespread. The SCA's RCS/ECS distinction is
anachronistic in the modern age of cloud computing, where cloud
providers do not act like an accountant receiving business records, but
more like a rental locker or a package carrier. The lack of a suppres-
sion remedy and the voluntary disclosure exception also contribute to
the SCA's overall ineffectiveness at protecting users' privacy interests.
Today, the proliferation of technology into the lives of millions of
people means that the need for Congress to amend the SCA is more
urgent than ever.
IV. REWRITING THE SCA FOR THE MODERN COMPUTING AGE
Calls for Congress to amend the SCA are not new.1 23 With the
explosion of cloud computing and Web 2.0 services in the past few
years however, it has become even more urgent and necessary for
Congress to bring the SCA into the twenty-first century. The aim of
my proposals is not to provide greater protection for stored electronic
communications than in other areas, but to bring that protection to a
level approaching that of Fourth Amendment protections. Thus, the
proposals recognize the important interests of law enforcement in
fighting crime and are modestly tailored such that they do not unduly
burden government officials. The proposals seek to bring privacy pro-
tections in line with constitutional privacy doctrine, and would not
affect legitimate emergency disclosures or publicly disclosed informa-
121 See Seth Rosenbloom, Note, Crying Wolf in the Digital Age: Voluntary Disclosure
Under the Stored Communications Act, 39 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 529, 546 (2008)
(quoting Vanessa Hwang, Note, Cable Modems and Privacy in the New Millennium, 32
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 727, 763 (2001)).
122 Id.
123 See, e.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform and the Revolution in Cloud
Computing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1lIth Cong. (2010) (statement of MarcJ. Zwillinger,
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center); Bellia, supra note 37, at 1436; Kerr,
supra note 29, at 1233-43; DirrAL DUE PROCESS COALITION, http://
www.digitaldueprocess.org (last visited Sept. 6, 2011).
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tion 124 where the user retains no reasonable expectation of privacy.
The ability of the government to successfully investigate, prosecute,
and obtain verdicts against criminals in non-Internet related areas
indicates that the Fourth Amendment's restrictions on governmental
action has not severely handicapped law enforcement's attempts to
fight crime. Meanwhile, the privacy protections have greatly benefit-
ted citizens in terms of law enforcement accountability and checking
governmental power.
In this section, I will first address some justifications for the
strengthening of privacy. Next, I propose three modifications to the
SCA that will help clarify and bolster the privacy protections of the
SCA in the age of cloud computing.
A. Why Strengthen Privacy?
As noted above in Part I in the various approaches to conceptual-
izing privacy, privacy can be a good in and of itself, as well as play an
important role in a democratic society. Julie Cohen notes that infor-
mation privacy promotes inventiveness and entrepreneurialship, rein-
forces the existing social fabric, and plays a role in defining our
collective vision of information technologies within society. 1 25 Neil
Richards puts forth a theory of intellectual privacy grounded in the
First Amendment, arguing that the safeguarding of our records of
intellectual activity is important to First Amendment values of free
thought and expression.1 2 6 A particularly important justification for
strengthening privacy is an economic-based justification, especially
given the Internet's importance as a forum for facilitating economic
activity. One distinct impediment to widespread adoption of cloud
computing at the corporate level is doubt about the level of security
cloud computing can provide for sensitive data. 12 7 While the law can-
not create technological security, it can allow for a more robust frame-
work that protects the privacy interests and expectations of data
owners. Stronger privacy protections for the cloud computing data of
124 Examples of publicly disclosed information might be status updates on
Facebook, blog postings on a publicly accessible site, or photo uploads on a cloud site
with the public-sharing feature activated.
125 See Cohen, supra note 13, at 1427-28.
126 See Richards, supra note 13, at 389.
127 See, e.g., Gain, supra note 91 ("IT managers of 750- to 1,000-user enterprises are
generally extremely cautious about handing over critical and sensitive data to a third
party on a platform as vaguely defined as 'the cloud.' Indeed, the main impedimint
to cloud computing's adoption that will likely remain an issue in the long term is the
high standard of security and reliability providers must offer to meet security, regula-
tory, and even data-ownership concerns.").
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corporate users will, in turn, create positive economic effects that
accompany the facilitation of commerce. Companies that can be
assured their sensitive corporate data will be protected in the hands of
cloud service providers are more likely to take advantage of the bene-
fits of operating on the Internet and using cloud computing services
to expand their business.
Another justification for strengthening privacy protections might
be because of shortcomings of a market-based approach to privacy
protections. Although some scholars contend "that the market is
functioning optimally and is already adequately accounting for privacy
concerns"1 28 with "market incentives for companies to keep their data
secret"1 29 (i.e., companies can change their privacy policies due to
publicized outcry or backlash), there are also limitations to relying
solely on the market-based approach. First, contract law is limited in
that it only protects the privacy of the parties to the contract and not
invasions by third parties outside of the contract. 130 Second, unequal
bargaining power between the parties means that most users do not
bargain over or choose services based on different companies' privacy
policies (nor would they usually be able to bargain over privacy terms,
which are generally offered on a "take it or leave it" basis).131 Compa-
nies' privacy policies tend to be "little more than 'notices' about a
company's policies rather than a contract," allow companies to
change the policy without the customer being able to prevent such
changes, and often lack binding enforcement mechanisms.132 These
factors combine to make it "difficult for consumers to bargain with
[companies] about their privacy because they lack expertise in privacy
issues and because it takes substantial time and effort."133 Yet, a
128 SeeS OLOVE, supra note 7, at 79. Solove notes that proponents of this view
argue that "[t]he fact that privacy is not afforded much protection demonstrates that
people value other things more than privacy-such as efficient and convenient trans-
actions." Id. at 81.
129 Id. at 80.
130 See id. at 81.
131 See id. at 82. There is usually some variation in the way certain service provid-
ers treat privacy. See, e.g., Katie Hafner & Matt Richtel, Google Resists U.S. Subpoena of
Search Data, N.Y. TIMES, January 20, 2006, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/01/20/technology/20google.html (noting that while Google was refusing to
comply with a government subpoena to turn over search engine records on the
grounds that it was overly broad, three of its competitors (America Online, Yahoo!,
and MSN) complied with the subpoenas). Yet, it is unclear whether consumers
choose providers based on privacy as a criterion or if other factors such as ease of use
and popularity are more important.
132 See SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 82-83.
133 Id. at 84.
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majority of Internet users maintain that they are concerned about
their online privacy.1 3 4
Although direct governmental intrusion into citizens' private life
is an often-cited fear, there is also a strong probability for non-govern-
mental actors to affect individuals' privacy greatly.1 35 Enormous
databases of information exist in the hands of private companies that
detail consumers' searching and purchasing habits, as well as individu-
als' demographic, educational, and work information. 13 6 Due to this
vast amount of information on individuals, governmental actors often
formally or informally solicit information from private companies
holding such information. In these informal situations, the possibility
arises that governmental actors can circumvent the SCA's formal pro-
cedures for disclosure either by appealing to the companies' desire to
help law enforcement or by claiming an emergency without certifying
it as such. Thus, private companies can wield enormous power in the
Internet setting, which is one of the reasons why amending the SCA is
preferable to waiting for judicial rulemaking to adapt the Fourth
Amendment to new technologies. While a Fourth Amendment pro-
tection for cloud-based technologies might prevent unreasonable gov-
ernment interferences with individual privacy, it would not protect
against interferences by private parties. Additionally, legislative
134 See Results from June 4-7 Nationwide Poll, ZOGBY INT'L, 1 (June 7, 2010), http://
www.precursorblog.com/files/pdf/topline-report-key-findings.pdf. This poll indi-
cated that 87% of adults surveyed nationwide are "concerned with the security of their
personal information on the Internet" and 80% of adults are "concerned with compa-
nies recording their online habits and using the data to generate profit through
advertising." Id. Whether this "concern" manifests itself in market choice seems
uncertain, given the proliferation of ad-supported services. Additionally, 79% of the
adults surveyed believed that law enforcement should have to get a warrant, like the
one required to wiretap phone conversations, to track where a user goes on the
Internet, versus 12% who say they do not; 88% believe consumers should enjoy "simi-
lar legal privacy protections online as they have offline"; and 49% believe government
regulators should play a larger role in protecting online consumer privacy, while
more than a third (36%) do not. Id.
135 See Clifford S. Fishman, Technology and the Internet: The Impending Destruction of
Privacy by Betrayers, Grudgers, Snoops, Spammers, Corporations, and the Media, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1503, 1504-05 (2004).
136 See SoLovE, supra note 7, at 3-4. The notion that "Google knows more about
you than your mother," is apparent in the fact that that we are willing to search for
topics that we might not want to discuss with our family or friends. See Robert L.
Mitchell, What Google Knows About You, COMPUTERWORLD, (May 11, 2009), http://
www.computerworld.com/s/article/337791 /WhatGoogle KnowsAboutYou. This
might be partially due to the mistaken belief that there is a layer of anonymity
between the Internet and our real selves. See Brian Kane & Brett T. Delange, A Tale of
Two Internets: Web 2.0 Slices, Dices, and Is Privacy Resistant, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 317, 332
(2009).
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rulemaking can be faster 137 and more flexible1 38 in light of the rapid
development of ever-changing technologies.
B. Proposed Modifications to the SCA
1. Remove the RCS/ECS Distinction and Require Warrants as a
General Rule
While the SCA was forward-looking in many ways, its conception
of electronic communications technologies remains stuck in the
1980s. Its distinction between ECS and RCS has become unwieldy and
has led to confusion and misapplication of the statute. The different
levels of protection depending on what function the Internet service is
performing at a given time belies the original purpose of the SCA,
which was to provide protection in an area where the courts were
unclear in their application of Fourth Amendment privacy protections
(yet where most people would have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy).13 9 This expectation of privacy, however, is not one that should
change according to the different stages in the lifecycle of an e-mail or
stored document. When a person sends an e-mail to another person,
he or she has the same expectation of privacy when composing the e-
mail, when clicking send, and when the other person receives the e-
mail, much as that person would have the same expectation of privacy
on a document he or she composes and stores locally on a home com-
puter. Thus, my first proposed modification would be to remove the
distinction between ECS and RCS and require the government to
show probable cause for a search warrant, as the Fourth Amendment
requires, before it can compel disclosure of stored electronic informa-
137 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 869 (2004) ("Years may pass before a
court considers how the Fourth Amendment regulates use of a new technology; many
more years may pass before the issue is resolved definitively. By the time the courts
decide how a technology should be regulated, however, the factual record of the case
may be outdated, reflecting older technology rather than more recent
developments.").
138 See id. at 871 ("Legislatures can experiment with different rules and make fre-
quent amendments; they can place restrictions on both public and private actors; and
they can even 'sunset' rules so that they apply only for a particular period of time.
The courts cannot." (footnotes omitted)).
139 For an outline of the different standards a single e-mail might face at different
points in its life cycle, see Electronic Communications Privacy Act Reform Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. App'x A, (2010) (statement of James X. Dempsey, Vice President for
Public Policy, Center for Democracy and Technology), available at http://judiciary.
house.gov/hearings/pdf/Dempseyl00505.pdf.
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tion. Having this as the general rule, with specific exceptions allowing
for lesser standards (such as in the case of emergencies), would
greatly simplify the statute, while allowing law enforcement to do its
job. 140
Although some might argue that requiring warrants might
impede law enforcement activities, there are still several important
benefits to having a warrant requirement, especially given the "tech-
nological and regulatory reach of government intrusions that exists
today." 14 1 First, warrants "aim[ I] to prevent searches from turning
into 'fishing expeditions.' "1 42 The Framers' experience with writs of
assistance and general warrants (which did not require specific indi-
viduals or specific places to be searched) that "resulted in 'sweeping
searches and seizures without any evidentiary basis' ' 143 and "'ran-
sacking' and seizure of the personal papers of political dissidents,
authors, and printers of seditious libel"'144 led to the inclusion of the
warrant clause. Thus, warrants must describe with "particular [ity] ...
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."1 45
Second, the warrant requirement enforces the separation of powers
and prevents the "excessive exercises of executive power."1 46 Since
warrants compel law enforcement officials to justify their exercises of
power, 147 this provides a structural check against abuses by such offi-
cials. At the same time, warrants "do not constitute an absolute bar to
the activities of law enforcement," but "merely ensure that law
enforcement officials focus on particular individuals and that they are
given adequate independent oversight."1 48
Why then is the current statutory regime insufficient? By
allowing the government to compel disclosure with only a subpoena
or a § 2703(d) court order, the statute's privacy protections are far
lower than that of the Fourth Amendment. According to Daniel
140 See Solove, supra note 113, at 1299.
141 Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust between
Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1751, 1804 (1994).
142 SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 192 (citing Louis Fisher, Congress and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 21 GA. L. REv. 107, 115 (1986) ("The spirit and letter of the fourth amendment
counseled against the belief that Congress intended to authorize a 'fishing expedi-
tion' into private papers on the possibility that they might disclose a crime.")).
143 Id. at 193 (quoting Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth
Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 82 (1988)).
144 Id. (quoting DAVID M. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAw, AND PUBLIC POLICY 38 (1979)).
145 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
146 Solove, supra note 113, at 1299.
147 Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REv.
1, 17 (1991).
148 Solove, supra note 113, at 1300.
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Solove, "[u]nlike warrants, subpoenas do not require probable cause
and can be issued without judicial approval. '149 William Stuntz notes
that "while searches typically require probable cause or reasonable
suspicion and sometimes require a warrant, subpoenas require noth-
ing, save that the subpoena not be unreasonably burdensome to its
target. Few burdens are deemed unreasonable. '" 15 0 Prosecutors can
issue subpoenas instead of neutral judicial officers and prosecutors
can use grand jury subpoenas to obtain third-party records. 151 Grand
jury subpoenas are "'presumed to be reasonable' and may only be
quashed if 'there is no reasonable possibility that the category of
materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant to
the general subject of the grand jury investigation.'-"152 Thus, the bur-
den on the government to provide relevant information is far lower,
because "[n]o showing of probable cause or reasonable suspicion is
necessary, and courts measure relevance and burden with a heavy
thumb on the government's side of the scales." 153
Court orders under § 2703(d) of the SCA also require less than a
search warrant. The relevant provision calls for: "specific and articul-
able facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or
other information sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation. 1 54 Since the standard only requires that the
information is "relevant and material" to the investigation, law
enforcement officials can get away with a lot more than if the standard
was probable cause. As with subpoenas, the problem with court
orders is that they "supply the judiciary with greatly attenuated over-
sight powers. 1 55 The judge's job is to "merely determine whether
producing records is overly burdensome" (in the case of subpoenas)
or whether the "records are 'relevant' to a criminal investigation, a
149 SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 202.
150 William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth
Amendment, 114 HARv. L. REV. 842, 857-58 (2001) (footnote omitted).
151 SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 202. The SCA requires "an administrative subpoena
authorized by a Federal or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial sub-
poena" served by the government entity. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (1) (B) (i) (2006). This
has been interpreted to exclude pre-trial discovery subpoenas. See F.T.C. v. Netscape
Comms. Corp., 196 F.R.D. 559, 560-61 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
152 SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 202-03 (quoting United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498
U.S. 292, 301 (1991)).
153 William J. Stunz, Pivacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 1016, 1038 (1995).
154 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).
155 SOLOVE, supra note 7, at 203.
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much weaker standard [than probable cause] .,,156 Instead of being an
impartial decision-maker that gets to determine whether to grant a
warrant, the judiciary's involvement with subpoenas and court orders
"amounts to little more than a rubber stamp of judicial legitimacy.' 57
With the scales tipped in favor of law enforcement, the potential is
greater for officials to engage in "fishing expeditions" and the delicate
balance that prevents "excesses" is upset.
2. Add a Statutory Suppression Remedy
A second possible change is for Congress to incorporate a statu-
tory suppression remedy into the SCA. This would likely deter abuses
of the statute by law enforcement officials. 158 The SCA's lack of a sup-
pression remedy is unlike Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968,159 the primary federal statute that governs
the interception of wire and oral communications, or the Fourth
Amendment, which provides for suppression if government action vio-
lates the statute. 160 As Justice Holmes noted, the Fourth Amendment
would be simply a "form of words" without the exclusionary rule.
16 1
This differentiation between interception of wire and oral communica-
tion and retrieval of stored electronic communications is unnecessary.
The same privacy interests are at stake concerning unreasonable
searches and seizures, and there is the same potential danger of law
enforcement officials' misconduct exists.
Furthermore, as Orin Kerr argues, adding an exclusionary rem-
edy would "benefit both civil libertarian and law enforcement interests
alike." 162 For civil libertarian interests, "a suppression remedy would
considerably increase judicial scrutiny of the government's Internet
surveillance practices in criminal cases," which would "clarify the rules
that the government must follow, serving the public interest of greater
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 The Fourth Amendment's suppression remedy is said to "protect[ ] innocent
people by eliminating the incentive to search and seize unreasonably." Arnold H.
Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV.
1229, 1266 (1983). Loewy notes that it does this so long as the law enforcement
officer's goals are to secure a conviction. Id. at 1266 n.169. If the officer is seeking to
harass a subject, the exclusionary rule would not help protect that subject against the
harassment. Id.
159 18 U.S.C. § 2515.
160 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Bellia, supra note 37, at 1436.
161 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
162 Kerr, supra note 116, at 807-08.
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transparency."'163 It would do this by giving defendants the option to
challenge government action in criminal cases. For law enforcement
interests, a suppression remedy would allow prosecutors to have
"greater control over the types of cases the courts decided, enjoy more
sympathetic facts, and have a better opportunity to explain and
defend law enforcement interests before the courts."'1 64 Thus, "[t]he
statutory law of Internet surveillance would become more like the
Fourth Amendment law: a source of vital and enforceable rights that
every criminal defendant can invoke, governed by relatively clear stan-
dards that by and large respect law enforcement needs and attempt to
strike a balance between those needs and privacy interests."
165
3. Clarify the Scope of Voluntary Disclosures
Finally, Congress can enhance privacy interests by clarifying the
scope of voluntary disclosures under a standard that sufficiently pro-
tects customers. As an effect of the limited remedies available to those
who have been harmed by SCA violations, the lack ofjudicial opinions
on the SCA means that the provisions for when a disclosure is volun-
tary and when it is compelled is not fully fleshed out. In seeking these
clarifications and changes, I use Fourth Amendment doctrine as the
standard for where the SCA should be.
I propose that if a cloud service provider voluntarily discloses
information because of misrepresentations or because of (illegiti-
mate) government coercion, then it should not be liable for such a
disclosure. Yet, there may still be instances where a service provider
might be liable for a voluntary disclosure, even if there was govern-
ment encouragement. For example, if there was no legal process and
the service provider voluntarily disclosed information in a non-emer-
gency situation (or other situations to be defined statutorily), the pro-
vider would be liable for a violation. In assessing the voluntariness of
the disclosure, a court should look at whether the provider discloses
the information under a good faith belief that it was compelled.
Thus, in a situation where there is a court order or warrant "for show"
(where the service provider came to the government seeking to dis-
close the information to begin with), such legal process should not
absolve the service provider of liability.
The other side of liability for compelled disclosures involves the
government. Here, the SCA should seek to model its standard such
that it is in line with Fourth Amendment standards for third parties
163 Id. at 807.
164 Id. at 807-08.
165 Id. at 808.
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acting as agents on behalf of the government. If the government com-
plies with the provisions in § 2703, then it should not be liable for any
SCA violations. On the other hand, if the government acted in such a
way as to cause the service provider to be its agent, then the govern-
ment should be liable for violation of the SCA. While Fourth Amend-
ment doctrine has not settled on the "appropriate inquiry to be
performed in determining whether involvement of the police trans-
forms a private individual into an agent or instrument of the
police,"1 66 any modification to the SCA should try to settle on a partic-
ular type of test, in the interests of clarity and consistency.
CONCLUSION
The Stored Communications Act has been noted as a "remarka-
ble achievement"16 7 and "forward-looking"1 68 for being able to adapt
its Fourth Amendment-like protections to emerging technologies,
especially in light of the fact that it was enacted in 1986. Yet, technol-
ogy has developed so much in the past twenty-five years that it has
outpaced the Act. The Internet has grown exponentially in those
years and is now an integral and pervasive part of millions of peoples'
lives. Countless industries, both Internet-based and non-Internet-
based, rely on and benefit from using the Internet as a market, a ser-
166 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 148 n.2 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
United States v. Pervaz, 118 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1997), considers the various
approaches of the Circuits. The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Lambert, 771 F.2d 83
(6th Cir. 1985), uses a narrow standard for agency action: "First, the police must have
instigated, encouraged or participated in the search. Second, the individual must
have engaged in the search with the intent of assisting the police in their investigative
efforts." Id. at 89. (citing United States v. Coleman, 628 F.2d 961, 965 (6th Cir.
1980)). The Ninth Circuit's standard is looser, holding that "two of the critical factors
in the 'instrument or agent' analysis are: (1) the government's knowledge and acqui-
escence, and (2) the intent of the party performing the search," Pervaz, 118 F.3d at
5-6 (citing United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1981)) and that the
"Fourth Amendment will not apply when the private party was acting for a reason that
is independent of such a governmental purpose," id. at 6 (citing United States v.
Attson, 900 F.2d 1427, 1433 (9th Cir. 1990)). Finally, the Tenth Circuit requires that
the government must "affirmatively encourage or instigate the private action," which
is determined by "the totality of the circumstances." Id. (citing United States v.
Smythe, 84 F.3d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir. 1996)). The First Circuit in Pervaz ended up
concluding that "any specific 'standard' or 'test' [was] likely to be oversimplified or
too general to be of help, and that all of the factors mentioned by the other circuits
may be pertinent in different circumstances." Id.
167 See Kerr, supra note 29, at 1243.
168 SeeJ. BECKWITH BURR, THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNIcATIONS PRIVACY Acr OF 1986:
PRINCIPLES FOR REFORM 1 (2010), available at http://www.digitaldueprocess.org/files/
DDPBurrMemo.pdf.
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vice, or a forum. It is against this backdrop that the emergence of
cloud computing technology takes place. The SCA's protections for
cloud computing will have enormous implications for the privacy
rights of millions of people. Cloud computing has the potential to
transform the way people interact and how companies run their busi-
nesses. Thus, it is important that Congress update the SCA to bring it
up to date with modern technologies so that the same privacy protec-
tions that exist for other forms of storage and communications exist in
the cloud.
